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Summary. — The globalization of world capitalism constrains the ability of the developmental state
to pursue an independent industrialization and foreign trade strategy. We use an intertemporal,
multiregion CGE model, to study the fundamental reasons for a financial crisis. We find that we
can create a realistic crisis in the Asia region when capital markets are open and there is an
unexpected rise in the risk premium of the Asia region. When capital markets are closed and the
state retains all its policy instruments, the Asia region not only avoids a crisis but increases its rate
of growth. Ó 2000 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Asian financial crisis has had a profound
impact on the global economy. Global growth
have been slower; risks has been higher; and the
international flows of capital have been severely
disrupted. The crisis has also revealed the
extent to which the globalization of world
capitalism constrains the capacity of a devel-
opmental state to implement an independent
strategy of industrialization and foreign trade.
Our reading of the actual Asian financial
crisis is that it cannot be explained by fiscal or
monetary excesses. Nor can it be explained by a
single factor. Rather, in practice, a multitude of
factors, both domestic and international,
contributed significantly to the crisis. On the
domestic side, there were faulty policies leading
up to the crisis; an incorrect mix of government
intervention with market forces in the gover-
nance and operation of both the financial and
corporate sectors; major instances of corrup-
tion; a lack of leadership commitment to
development which allowed political consider-
ations and, in some Asian countries, personal
greed to dominate government economic deci-
sion.
The incorrect policies included maintaining
an appreciating exchange rate, allowing wages
to rise faster than productivity (especially in
Korea), and maintaining a risk-adjusted real
interest rate that was substantially higher than
the world real rate. The combination of these
policies led to a progressive loss of competi-
tiveness on world markets and, ultimately, a
negative balance of trade.
The inappropriate mix of government and
market forces consisted of: combining govern-
ment-mandated, corruption-motivated loans to
mismanaged business groups with a lack of
banking regulation and transparency; combin-
ing a high interest rate on loans with too low a
spread between deposit rates and loan rates
(especially in Korea); postponing the necessary
World Development Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 1087–1100, 2000
Ó 2000 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
0305-750X/00/$ - see front matter
PII: S0305-750X(00)00014-0
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
* A previous version of this paper was presented at a
GTAP conference in Odensee Denmark, June 1999 and
at the Third International Conference by METU in
Ankara, September 1999. We are indebted to A. Salih,
W. Mc Kibbin, N. Alemdar, K. Boratav, X. Diao and to
colleagues at Berkeley and Bilkent for their helpful
comments. None of them bears any responsibility for the
policy implications and views expressed in this paper.
1087
adjustments of exchange rates to the apprecia-
tion of the domestic currencies induced by the
Japanese recession; having an incorrect mix of
regulation and liberalization of the financial
system, characterized by very little prudential
regulation of banks and corporations combined
with greater freedom in borrowing and lending,
especially abroad; and removing controls on
financial markets combined with setting high
domestic interest rates and maintaining
domestic financial repression.
On the international side, the actual crisis
was due to institutional deficiencies in the
architecture of the global economy’s financial
system to which the region had become
vulnerable as a result of the liberalization of its
financial markets. Most contributors to this
issue agree that the short-term global financial
markets are too large, too volatile, too perfect,
and too subject to herd psychology.
Finally, one might also view the crisis as the
result of a fundamental incompatibility
between an independent national financial
policy with complete financial liberalization.
Two of the major policy mistakes of Asian
countries were trying to have an exchange rate
policy which was out of alignment with
purchasing power parity and an interest rate
which was out of alignment with world interest
rates, while having largely liberalized capital
flows. The Asian crisis demonstrated graphi-
cally that this is an economic impossibility. The
crisis also revealed how unforgiving global
markets are to mistakes in economic policy and
to institutional inadequacies within countries
and how severe the penalties for mistakes are.
Which of these multitude of factors were
essential to the crisis? This is the question we
attempt to answer in this paper. To disentangle
the fundamental forces from the merely
contributory ones requires a modeling
approach. We utilize a multi-region, intertem-
porally consistent computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) model to study this issue. The
global world economy is disaggregated into
three regions (developed, underdeveloped, and
the crisis-hit Asian economies), each of which
produces output in four sectors (agriculture,
consumer manufacturing, producer manufac-
turing, and services). The model is fully Walr-
asian. It has perfect markets with
intertemporally rational, preference-optimizing
consumers and profit-maximizing, competitive
producers in both factor and commodity
markets. The model also accommodates finan-
cial flows, in the form of domestic and foreign
bonds, that respond to interest rate dieren-
tials.
The model is useful because it permits us to
isolate analytically the conditions leading to a
financial crisis. The model can generate a
financial crisis without government interven-
tion, irrational expectations, imperfect markets,
lack of information, lack of transparency or
corruption. We shall see that we are able to
create a crisis, with roughly the same impact on
growth as experienced by East Asia in actuality,
in a full Arrow-Debreu setup with Ramsey-type
forward-looking, intertemporally optimizing
rational agents and no government intervention
or International Monetary Fund (IMF) condi-
tionality.
Experiments with the model indicate that the
fundamental culprit is the liberalization of
capital inflows and outflows. We can generate a
crisis merely by adding foreign borrowing and
lending to the traditional fully neoclassical real
model. In contrast, by closing the domestic
economy to international capital flows we can
avoid a crisis. We model private foreign
borrowing as a function of ‘‘financial arbi-
trage,’’ i.e. of the dierential between the net,
risk adjusted, real return on foreign exchange in
domestic and world markets. Increased foreign
indebtedness leads to increased financial
fragility of the region. The fragility is modeled
by a risk-generator function which sets the
regionÕs risk premium proportional to the ratio
of its foreign deficit to its aggregate GDP. The
financial crisis arises when there is a sudden,
unexpected, but not irrational, increase in the
proportionality parameter linking the deficit-
ratio to the region’s risk premium in the risk-
generator function.
The paper is organized as follows: In section
2, we provide a brief overview of theory and
experience with financial liberalization. We
introduce the salient features of our comput-
able generalized equilibrium (CGE) model in
section 3. Section 4 presents a numerical
general equilibrium analysis of the root-causes
and consequences of the crisis. We draw the
policy implications from a development-eco-
nomics perspective in the final section.
2. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION:
THEORY AND REALITY
The proponents of financial liberalization
rely on standard economic theory to deduce the
proposition that, in a world of freely mobile
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capital, funds would flow from high-saving to
low-saving countries, thereby equalizing inter-
est rates globally and enabling countries to
escape the size constraints upon their domestic
asset markets. This hypothesis leads to the
expectation that funds would flow from the
capital-abundant ‘‘North’’ to the capital-scarce
‘‘South,’’ promoting not only increased global
eciency, but also improved global equity.
This benign view of the implications of
international capital-mobility has been chal-
lenged significantly by events in the last two
decades. The findings from many empirical case
studies of recent financial crises (especially, the
Mexican, Turkish and East Asian ones) indi-
cate that the expected beneficial eects of
capital inflows are overshadowed by the
adverse impacts of excessive capital-market,
stock-market and exchange-rate volatility. The
eects of volatility had been generally ignored
in traditional global capital market models.
Furthermore, in a world of volatile exchange
rates, the theoretically-predicted global equal-
ization of interest rates need not take place. In
such a world the free mobility of international
capital flows does not suce to equalize real
domestic interest rates on loans that are
denominated in dierent currencies. One can
distinguish between two types of interest rate
dierentials: covered and uncovered (see, e.g.,
Frankel, 1991). Denoting the domestic and
foreign interest rates by r and r, respectively;
and the forward premium on foreign currency
by D, covered interest rate parity holds when
r ÿ r  D. By contrast, uncovered interest
parity holds if the interest rate dierential is
equated to the expected rate of depreciation of
the currency: r ÿ r  ED. This latter condition
requires covered interest parity plus the absence
of any exchange-risk premium. There is now
firm evidence that while covered interest parity is
satisfied, for both developed economies and for
those developing countries which have liberal-
ized their capital markets, uncovered interest
parity is not satisfied. The persistent divergence
between real rates of return across countries has
been documented by Frankel (1991, 1992, 1993),
Marston (1997), Halwood and MacDonald
(1994), Blecker (1998) and Eatwell (1996). As
noted by Frankel (1991, p. 252)
a currency premium remains, consisting of an ex-
change risk premium plus expected real currency
depreciation. This means that, even with the equaliza-
tion of covered interest rates, large dierentials in real
interest rates remain (emphasis original).
The currency premiums, with the resultant
dierentials in real rates of return across
countries, will provide one of the main dynamic
adjustment mechanisms in our model.
Finally, it is also worth noting that while the
postfinancial liberalization global economy is
characterized by very large gross capital flows,
it has generated rather small net transfers. As
indicated by Tobin (this issue), as of 1995, net
capital flows from developed to underdevel-
oped countries were only $150 billions per
annum, while the daily volume of, mostly
speculative, foreign exchange transactions
reached $1.5 trillions. The gross volume of
international capital flows across national
boundaries is far in excess of the financing
needs of the sum of commodity trade flows and
investments in physical capital, and is mostly
driven by speculative considerations of risk
hedging and currency speculation. 1
3. THE MODEL
The model is based on neoclassical growth
theory. It is a global intertemporal computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model with a
multiregion specification. We distinguish three
regions (Underdeveloped POOR, Developed
RICH, and Crisis-Hit Asian region, CHAR).
Each region produces four types of goods in the
same number of production-sectors.
The general characteristics of this model are
well known: 2 Infinitely-lived households
consume home produced and imported goods
so as to maximize an additively separable,
intertemporal utility function. Household
income is either consumed or saved. Savings
take the form of equity in domestic firms or in
foreign bonds. The private agents in each
region have free access to an open, unregulated,
world capital market at a given world interest
rate.
One distinguishing feature of the current
model is its treatment of the determination of
the interest rate at the regional level. 3 The
domestic rate of interest diers from the world
interest rate by a risk premium. The risk
premium is determined endogenously, in a
function which makes it proportional to the
ratio of the foreign deficit to GDP. The ‘‘Asian
Crisis’’ starts with a sudden rise in the
proportionality parameter linking the risk
premium to the ratio of the deficit to GDP.
Contagion to other developing countries
occurs when the proportionality factor in the
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risk-premium function of the POOR region
rises as well.
The main actors in the model are households
and firms who interact in commodity and
factor markets. Government does not consume,
save or invest. Instead, we assume that all
government income is transferred directly to
households, in the form of lump-sum transfers.
The government budget is therefore presumed
to be always balanced and there are no
macroeconomic, fiscal-finance issues in this
model.
(a) Households and their consumption/savings
In each region, the representative household
owns labor, capital and all financial wealth, and
allocates income to consumption and savings
so as to maximize an intertemporal utility over
an infinite horizon. The utility of the repre-
sentative household in each region consists of
the sum of the sequence of temporal utilities of
aggregate consumption, discounted over an








where q is the positive rate of time preference;
U is instantaneous felicity at each time
period. TCt is the instantaneous aggregate-





where 0 < bi < 1, and Rbi  1.
The household in each region maximizes (1)
subject to an intertemporal budget constraintX1
t1
RtP TCt  TCt  x1; 3
where Rt 
Qt
s1 1=1 rs represents the
discount-factor and rs is the instantaneous
interest rate. In (3), PTC is the consumer price
index such that P TCt TCt 
P
i PCitCit with PCit
denoting the (composite) price of commodity-i;
and x1 is the present value of the private
household’s aggregate financial wealth.
Households allocate their total income flows,
from both financial and non-financial sources,
between consumption and savings. The current
budget constraint for the household is:
SAVt  WtLt  WktKt  TIt ÿ rtDtÿ1
ÿ P TCt TCt; 4
where SAV is regional private savings; W is
the wage rate; L the labor endowment; TI is
the lump-sum transfer of the government’s tax
revenues; Wk the capital rental rate, K is the
stock of physical capital—all in period t. The
term rtDtÿ1 is the total interest payment on
the outstanding foreign debt.
The Euler equation (derived from the first-
order condition of intertemporal utility maxi-
mization) implies that marginal utility ratios
across any two adjacent periods satisfy the
following condition:
U 0t1




P TCt 1 rt1
; 5
where U 0t is the derivative of the instantaneous
utility function at time t with respect to aggre-
gate consumption TCt. Eqn. (5) states that the
marginal rate of substitution between
consumption at time t and t  1 must equal the
ratio of the consumption price indices across
the same time periods. Given the consumption-
aggregation function (2), the price index of
aggregate consumption, PTC, is determined








(b) Firms and investment
The model distinguishes four production
sectors: agriculture; consumer manufacturing;
machinery and producer manufacturing; and
services. Each sector produces a single output
using labor, capital and intermediate goods as
inputs. Labor and already-invested physical
capital are not traded internationally. Value-
added in each sector is a Cobb–Douglas func-
tion of capital and labor. Intermediate input-
use is in fixed proportions.
The aggregate capital stock is managed by an
independent investor (bank) who decides on the
total investment level in each period and passes
on all profits to households. The introduction
of this bank-artifact serves to isolate the capital
pricing and investment decisions of firms from
the household-consumption and saving deci-
sions. (As indicated below, foreign capital
inflow makes up the dierence between aggre-
gate domestic savings and investment.) The
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investor chooses a time path of investment





RtWktKt ÿ VIt 7
subject to a set of capital-accumulation
constraints:
Kt1  1ÿ dKt  It; 8
where VIt is the value of investment at t; It the
new addition to physical capital; and d is the
(constant) capital-depreciation rate. We assume
that the technology for producing capital-
equipment exhibits constant returns to scale,
there is no technical progress, and that there are
no additional capital-installation costs beyond
the cost of the final goods used in capital-goods
production. Hence, when the level of invest-
ment is positive, in equilibrium, the value of
each unit of capital equipment is uniquely
determined by the prices of the investment
goods. Thus, VIt  P It It, where P It is the cost for
each unit of It.
Under conditions of open, unregulated world
capital markets, in equilibrium, the following
no-arbitrage condition must also be satisfied:
rtP Itÿ1  Wkt ÿ dP It  P It ÿ P Itÿ1: 9
This condition states that the total returns to
capital must match the return to a perfectly
substitutable asset of size P Itÿ1. The left-hand
side of Eqn. (9) represents the returns from a
perfectly substitutable asset of size P Itÿ1, and the
right side of (9) is the total return from one unit
of capital equipment, consisting of ‘‘dividends’’
from capital-ownership at each period, Wkt,
minus the loss of value of capital equipment
caused by depreciation, dP It , plus a claim to an
instantaneous capital gain (or loss) equal to
P It ÿ P Itÿ1, if the cost of producing one unit of
capital changes over time. The no-arbitrage
condition of Eqn. (9) is used to determine the
path of investment-demand in each region.
(c) The foreign sector and foreign assets
Commodities are dierentiated in both
demand and supply by their geographical ori-
gin. Regions are linked, on the demand side, by
an Armingtonian composite-good system, and,
on the supply side, by a constant-elasticity-of-
transformation (CET) system. Domestically
produced and foreign goods are regarded as
imperfect substitutes in both trade and
production, and assigned elasticities of substi-
tution and transformation.
In each period, as investment and savings are
independently determined in the model, the
dierence between the value of investment, P It It,
and the regional private savings, SAVt, if
positive, is the increase in debt of the home
region borrowed from the other two foreign
regions; i.e.,
Dt ÿ Dtÿ1  rtDtÿ1  FBt; 10
where rtDtÿ1 is the debt service payment and a
positive FBt represents the foreign trade deficit.
(d) Determination of the risk premium
In view of the persistence of significant
interest rate dierentials across countries (see
section 2), we use the following version of
uncovered interest parity spelled out in real
terms:
r  DPR  r  DP   DeR  pR;
where r is the domestic (region RÕs) interest
rate; r is the world interest rate in the inter-
national capital market; DPR denotes changes in
domestic (region RÕs) price level; DP  denotes
changes in world price level; DR is the change
in nominal exchange rate; and pR is the risk
premium which attaches to the domestic
(region RÕs) capital market.
Transforming, we obtain:
r ÿ r  DP  ÿ DPR  DR  pR;
which decomposes interest-dierentials into
two components: deviations from relative
purchasing power parity (the right-hand side
term in parenthesis) and a real risk premium.
Since we define the real exchange rate as the
ratio of domestic to the foreign price level (see
below) the terms in parenthesis vanish and we
are left with: r2  r  pR.
We model the risk premium as a function of
the ratio of the foreign deficit to GDP:
pt  PR FBtGDPt
 
: 11
Eqn. (11) is designed to capture the underlying
disequilibrating characteristics of free interna-
tional capital mobility: with a ‘‘positive’’ signal
from the domestic economy, capital inflows are
attracted into the domestic asset markets,
causing a rapid accumulation of current-ac-
count deficits. The initial bonanza of debt-fi-
nanced public (e.g., Turkey) or private (e.g.,
MINIMAL CONDITIONS FOR A FINANCIAL CRISIS 1091
Mexico, Korea) spending escalates rapidly.
This raises the risk-premium and generates
severe fragility in the shallow financial markets
of the home country. Eventually, the bubble
bursts, and a series of severe and onerous
adjustments are set in motion: very high real
interest rates, sizable devaluations, and a severe
retrenchment of aggregate demand. When the
short-term ‘‘hot money’’ rushes out, the coun-
try is left broke, in a state of austerity and
deprived of traditional tools of macroeconomic
adjustment. This process generates an endoge-
nous financial crisis analogous to that delin-
eated by Minsky (1954) for the interaction of
domestic business cycles with financial cycles.
Elements of this vicious cycle are described in
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Diao, Li and
Yeldan (1998), Dornbusch, Goldfajn and
Valdes (1995), Velasco (1987), Diaz-Alejandro
(1985), and more recently referred to as the
Neftcßi–Frenkel cycle in Taylor (1998) (follow-
ing Neftcßi, 1998; Frenkel, 1998).
(e) Equilibrium
Intratemporal equilibrium requires that
during each time period, (i) in each region,
demand for production factors equals their
supply; (ii) in world commodity markets,
aggregate demand for each sectoral good
equals its total supply; (iii) and in the world’s
capital market, aggregate household savings
equals zero when summed over all regions.
Intertemporal equilibria are described mainly
by the dierence Eqs. (5), (9) and (10). For the
steady-state equilibrium path, the following
constraints must also be satisfied for each
region:
rss  d  Wkss=P Iss; 12
Iss  dKss; 13
FBss  rssDss  0: 14
Eqn. (12) specifies that, in the steady state, the
net marginal return of capital, normalized by
the marginal value of capital, is constant and
equal to the interest plus the depreciation rates;
hence the marginal cost of investment and the
capital rental rate are also constant. Eqn. (13)
requires that aggregate investment just covers
the depreciation of capital; hence, in the
absence of labor growth and technical change,
the capital/labor ratio also becomes constant.
Eqn. (14) states that foreign debt holding is also
constant. If a region holds foreign debt in the
steady state (i.e., Dss is positive), then it has to
have a trade surplus to pay the interest costs to
foreigners on the outstanding debt (i.e., FBss
has to be negative). Moreover, in the steady
state, as each region ceases to borrow from
foreigners, domestic household savings ought
to equal the value of aggregate capital invest-
ment.
(f) The numeraire
Central to any general equilibrium model is
the specification of the numeraire, which we
now make precise. In each region K, define the





where XKi is the weight of price i (which is set
equal to the share in consumption-demand of
the ith good). We choose the period 1 price
index of the RICH region as the unit of value in
our analysis. Therefore, all nominal values are
expressed relative to PINDEXRICH ;1.
Of particular interest is the concept of the
real exchange rate, which we define as the
relative cost of the common reference basket of
goods among two regions, where the basketsÕ
costs in the two regions are compared after
conversion into the common numeraire. For
two regions A and B, with price levels
PINDEXA;t and PINDEXB;t, we say that region-
A experiences a real appreciation (region-B, real
depreciation) when the ratio of the respective
price indexes, PINDEXA;t/PINDEXB;t, rises
(see, e.g., Obstfeld & Rogo, 1996, chapter 4).
4. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
OF THE ASIAN CRISIS
What are the minimal conditions for gener-
ating a financial crisis? To answer this question
we impose the same economic shock on the
Asia region under two distinct scenarios,
reflecting extremes in the degrees of external
liberalization of the economy. Under the first
scenario, neither trade nor capital markets are
liberalized and the state retains its full panoply
of policy instruments (experiment 1). Under the
second scenario, both commodity markets and
financial markets are completely liberalized; as
a result, the state has becomes economically
ineective, as it has no policy instruments at its
disposal (experiments 2 and 3). In this scenario
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1092
we analyze the consequences for all regions
with and without contagion from the Asia
region to the region of least developed nations.
(a) Experiment 1: the developmental state:
closed capital markets, pre-GATT
Under the first scenario, we examine quan-
titatively the dynamics of the so-called Neftcßi-
Frenkel cycle (Taylor, 1998) in the context of
Asian development. Starting from a reference
path, we assume that the East Asian region
experiences a parametric rise of 5% in the
productivity of investment in physical capital. 4
The positive productivity shock induces a rise
in aggregate demand for investment in the
region. Since in this experiment external finance
is restricted, however, the burden of adjustment
falls entirely on the domestic economy. In view
of the regionÕs history of active export promo-
tion, we assume that the government responds
to the need for increased foreign exchange and
savings by introducing an export-subsidization
program. We then let the model solve for the
necessary adjustments in sectoral subsidy rates
required to generate the requisite flow of
foreign exchange earnings essential for financ-
ing the larger level of investment needed to take
advantage of its greater productivity. 5
The dynamics of adjustment are summarized
in the EXP-1 columns of Table 1. The positive
shock in the productivity of aggregate invest-
ment leads to a rise of investment expenditures
by 18.4%, prompting both increased domestic
savings and more foreign exchange earnings
through enhanced exports. Specifically, our
numerical results indicate that the domestic
saving rate is increased by three percentage
points, from 29% to 32%, as the marginal rate
of substitution between current and future
Table 1. General equilibrium results (ratios of deviation)
EXP-1 (Relative to BASE Path) EXP-2 (Relative to Exp1)
Period 1 Period 5 Period 15 Period 1 Period 5 Period 15
Crisis hit Asian region, CHAR
Gross domestic product 1.068 1.051 1.032 0.919 0.940 0.969
Consumption 0.979 1.003 1.029 0.992 0.984 0.986
Investment 1.184 1.146 1.105 0.928 0.948 0.954
Capital stock 1.011a 1.036 1.075 0.995b 0.985 0.970
Exports 1.077 1.052 1.026 0.938 0.964 0.992
Imports 1.073 1.050 1.025 0.913 0.934 0.964
Foreign capital inflows 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.373 0.304 0.384
Real exchange rateb 1.053 1.026 0.998 0.933 0.953 0.982
Output supply
Agriculture 0.982 1.004 1.027 1.002 0.993 0.990
Consumer manufacturing 1.070 1.061 1.053 0.937 0.956 0.977
Producer manufacturing 1.086 1.069 1.052 0.944 0.964 0.976
Services 0.969 1.000 1.032 1.032 1.009 0.987
EXP-3 (Relative to BASE Path)
Period 1 Period 5 Period 15
Underdeveloped Region, POOR
Gross domestic product 0.922 0.922 0.932
Consumption 0.971 0.970 0.984
Investment 0.921 0.900 0.807
Capital stock 0.996a 0.985 0.937
Exports 1.032 1.031 1.016
Imports 0.885 0.885 0.899
Foreign capital inflows 0.009 0.039 0.232
Real exchange rateb 0.925 0.928 0.955
Output supply
Agriculture 0.994 0.991 0.992
Consumer manufacturing 1.036 1.026 0.990
Producer manufacturing 0.993 0.977 0.912
Services 0.992 0.984 0.956
a Period 2.
b Ratio of the Consumer Price Index to the Consumer Price Index of the RICH. An increase indicates appreciation.
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consumption falls due to the higher produc-
tivity of savings. The impact equilibrium rate of
export subsidy rises by five percentage points.
The region meets the increased import demand
(by 7.3% upon impact) through increased
export earnings, and the overall foreign balance
is maintained constant, at its initial base-path
level.
The real exchange rate appreciates, due to the
nature of the shock. Positive gains in GDP lead
to a rise in the cost of the domestic consump-
tion basket relative to its world-market price.
Yet, the government does not allow the
appreciation of the real exchange rate to dete-
riorate the competitiveness of exports; it
counteracts this eect by its active subsidization
of exports. 6 The gross domestic product
increases by 6.8% over its base path, and, as
households respond to the higher returns on
savings by substituting future consumption for
current consumption. Domestic savings rise to
finance the increased pace of capital accumu-
lation. This enables the aggregate capital stock
to be 7.5% larger by period 15. Thus, the
positive productivity shock and active govern-
ment response, permitted by the absence of
restraints on commercial policy and closed
financial markets, result in a substantial net
benefit to the economy.
(b) Experiment 2: the impotent state: open
capital markets, post-GATT
Now consider the same productivity shock
under a post-GATT regime, which abolishes
export subsidies, and with a deregulated capital
account. With unregulated, open capital
markets, the productivity gains stimulate
foreign capital inflows. In addition, rational
domestic agents substitute consumption inter-
temporally, reducing today’s consumption in
favor of greater future consumption. Current
consumption expenditures fall, allowing
domestic savings to rise to help finance
increased investment expenditures. Up to here
the eects on the economy are beneficial. There
is an investment boom, and an increase in the
rate of economic growth typical of the first
phase of financial crises in an open economy.
The increased foreign capital inflow,
however, inevitably leads to an appreciation of
the domestic currency in real terms, resulting in
a loss of international competitiveness of the
country’s exports. This leads to a contraction of
exports relative to what they would have been
without the appreciation. The foreign deficit
widens as a result. This rise in deficit is inter-
preted by international financial markets as a
signal of increased financial fragility, typical of
the second phase of a financial crisis, in which a
boom carries with it the seeds of its own
destruction due to greater financial risk.
Our numerical simulations indicate that, by
comparison with the initial reference path, the
foreign deficit widens threefold upon impact to
reach 6.3% of GDP. The percentage deficit
remains above 4% until the end of the first five
years of adjustment, and does not converge
back to its initial level until year 10 (see Figure
1). The international financial markets respond
Figure 1. Ratio of foreign deficit to the GDP under unregulated capital inflows.
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to this indicator of the boom’s financial fragil-
ity by withdrawing capital from the economy
abruptly, in a herd-psychology induced self-
fulfilling panic. Net foreign capital inflows drop
to 63% of their base value.
We model the financial fragility of the East
Asian region with the aid of the risk generator
function (Eqn. (11) above) in which the risk
premium rises (falls) in proportion to the ratio
of foreign deficit to GDP. We simulate the
panic elements of the crisis by an abrupt,
parametric, 10-fold rise in the risk parameter
PR in Eqn. (11). This has the eect of increas-
ing the domestic rate of interest over the world
interest rate substantially and of choking o
foreign lending. Consequently, investment
demand drops abruptly, and GDP contracts
despite a real devaluation.
Observe that, in this formulation of financial
fragility, the ‘‘deterioration’’ of macro funda-
mentals which leads to an increase in risk
premium, reflects neither public mismanage-
ment, nor deficiencies in banking or corporate
governance, nor market imperfections or moral
hazard, but is a direct consequence of the
inherent characteristics of well-functioning,
integrated global capital markets. Indeed, as
many contributors to this special issue claim,
one might say that the financial markets are too
perfect. They permit herd behavior leading to
financial panic and crisis.
We summarize the response of the region’s
main macroeconomic aggregates to the crisis
and the contagion eects in the world financial
and commodity markets under the EXP-2
columns of Table 1. We present our numerical
results for this experiment as percentages of
their values in EXP-1, the environment with
regulated capital flows. Our results indicate
that, by comparison to EXP-1, gross domestic
product in the Asian region contracts by 8.2%
upon impact, and remains trapped in a 3.1%
lower long-run equilibrium growth path. In
Figure 2, we depict the extent of cumulative
losses of GDP in relation to their theoretically
expected, potential level. Such losses in poten-
tial GDP escalate rapidly and reach 25% by
period 5, and 70% by period 15.
The major macro aggregates of the postcrisis
adjustment path of the East Asia region are
further portrayed in Figure 3. The sudden
increase in the risk premium leads to a diver-
gence between the domestic (regional) interest
rate and the world interest rate. The resulting
increase in the regional rate of interest chokes
o investment demand (by 7.2% upon impact,
and by 4.6% as of period 15), and reduces
private consumption expenditures, but only
very slightly. The contraction of investment
leads directly to a slowdown in capital accu-
mulation and decline in real output. The
deceleration in the rate of growth of the capital
stock deepens progressively, and by period 15,
is 3.0% lower than in EXP-1 (Figure 3). Thus,
the experiment indicates that the postcrisis
adjustment of the Asian region involves
substantial contraction of real output together
with sluggish accumulation patterns.
Had it not been for the increase in the
economy’s risk premium (which is, alas, inevi-
table) and for the unregulated nature of capital
flows, the contraction in investment and output
Figure 2. Cumulative loss of post-crisis GDP compared to intertemporal equilibrium of EXP-1.
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would have resulted in a self-regulating
economic cycle and a soft landing even without
government policy intervention. With normal
marginal eciency of investment curves, the
expansion of the capital stock which preceded
the crisis would have eventually led to a drop in
the marginal productivity of investment, trig-
gering a decline in the rate of growth of further
investment expenditures, and a narrowing in
the savings-investment gap. Inflows of foreign
capital would then have been reduced, the
foreign deficit fallen and the exchange rate
devalued. The economy would have been
running a trade surplus to pay for the interest
costs of the initial debt accumulated. And
intertemporal optimizers, who initially raised
their savings in response to the increase in the
rate of return of invested saving, would now
reduce their savings and enjoy a higher level of
consumption into the indefinite future. In the
very long run, the economy would have
approached a new, lower, steady-state equilib-
rium.
Instead, however, rather than the smooth
adjustments forecast by textbook models of
consumption smoothing and intertemporal
optimization, the openness of capital markets
and increase in regional risk premium allowed
the disequilibria in fundamentals to escalate.
Massive movements of capital amplified the
traditional adjustment process so much that the
economy overshot and was unable to return to
its pre-shock, long-run equilibrium growth
path. In the case of our experiment, the massive
movements of capital wound up inducing an
escalation in risk-premium which converted a
positive shock into a financial and real crisis.
The real negative shock generated by the large
capital outflows far exceeded that required for
adjustment and persisted into the long run. In
the words of Blecker (1998, p. 30) ‘‘capital
mobility seems to introduce what might be
called ÔnonlinearitiesÕ into the intertemporal
adjustment process... causing current account
imbalances to persist or to grow more severe.’’
(c) Experiment 3: the impotent state: open
capital markets, post-GATT, contagion to other
developing countries
In this experiment, we study the eects of
contagion to other developing countries.
Technically, we model the contagion cycle by
repeating Experiment 2, but with increased risk
premium for the POOR region as well. Thus,
we impose increased fragility in global capital
markets.
We find that the contagion cycle is more
contractionary for the rest of the developing
world than was the financial crisis for the East
Asian region. This is partly due to the fact that
the POOR region’s financial crisis did not result
from an initial increase in the productivity of its
capital, but was simply the result of irrational
contagion from East Asia. Even though the
pre-crisis, precontagion fundamentals of the
region remained unchanged, foreign capital
inflows into the region collapse. The POOR
region’s GDP declines by as much 7.8% (EXP-3
path of Table 1) upon impact and remains 6.8%
below its base level in year 15. Fixed investment
demand slumps by 7.9% at impact (Figure 4).
Figure 3. Macro aggregates under post-crisis Asia.
WORLD DEVELOPMENT1096
The long-term eects of the crisis are felt more
severely over time as the deceleration of the rate
of capital accumulation deepens; it reaches a
20% lower level by year 15. The impact on the
POOR, contagion-hit region, which was
completely blameless, is thus permanent.
A counterpart of all these adjustments is the
behavior of the (real) exchange rate. Our
numerical results show a real depreciation of
the currency in both postcrisis Asia and post-
contagion underdeveloped region. But the
magnitude of the real depreciation in the model
was much smaller than it had been in the actual
Asian crisis. When the capital flows are dras-
tically reduced (see Figure 5) domestic curren-
cies suer a real depreciation of only 7.1% as
compared to the 50% depreciation that occur-
red in practice in the Asian region. One can
conjecture that the lower depreciation in the
model is due to the fact that the model econ-
omy does not undergo a banking crisis at the
same time as it experiences a financial crisis.
While domestic interest rate escalate, there is no
scramble for liquidity in the model, and no
liquidation of assets to obtain foreing
exchange. In addition, the model has flexible
exchange rates, so that the adjustment to the
shock imparted by the reversal of capital flows
can be more gradual. In our formulation,
exchange rate declines do not, in and of them-
Figure 4. Macro aggregates in the underdeveloped region under contagion of global crisis.
Figure 5. Inflow of foreign capital in post-crisis Asia and the underdeveloped region after contagion.
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selves, aect the risk premium and cause
increased capital outflows and greater domestic
interest rates.
Perhaps the most pernicious long-run eect
of the Asian crisis on their development consist
of the nature of the structural change that it
induces in real output supplies, capital accu-
mulation and pattern of economic growth.
Upon impact, we observe a drop in the gross
output of consumer and producer manufac-
turing industries and a rise in agriculture and
services. In the short run, this eect is due
purely to relative price movements. In the
medium term, the decline in manufacturing
results from the contraction of aggregate
investment demand, which leads to a defla-
tionary environment in which demand for
producer-manufacturing falls in a sustained
fashion. (Figure 6). As patterns of capital
accumulation diverge from their base trajec-
tory, producer-manufacturing output-growth
slows down and a process of deindustrialization
develops. This is arguably the most detrimental
long-run consequence of financial crises for
economic development.
5. POLICY DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Experiments 1 and 2 describe how a financial
crisis arises when capital markets are open and
does not arise when capital markets are closed
and the government retains its full arsenal of
instruments for policy intervention. By gener-
ating the financial crisis within a set of globally
interacting world regions embedded in a CGE
model, we stripped away a large number of
features of reality that are often blamed for
giving rise to financial crises. The model in which
the opening up of capital markets breeds a
financial crisis is entirely neoclassical, with fully
functioning commodity and financial markets,
in which both factor movements and trade
adjust flexibly to market conditions. The actors
are completely rational and forward looking.
Exchange rates are flexible. Financial markets
are not plagued by moral hazard or incomplete
information. The banking system is not under-
developed or underregulated. In the model
banks intermediate perfectly between savings
and investment, allocating resources to their
most profitable uses. Financial transactions
occur at arm’s-length, and are not characterized
by crony capitalism. Corruption does not play a
role in the interaction of the private sector of the
model economy with either the government or
the financial system. There are no macroeco-
nomic excesses, as the government budget is
always balanced. There is also no IMF.
The crisis is generated endogenously by a
single trigger: an increase in the risk premium
that is fully justified by the mounting level of
foreign indebtedness and by the increasing size
of the current account deficit in the periods
preceding the crisis. In turn, the rising deficit
and foreign indebtedness are themselves due to
large inflows of foreign capital fueled by
expectations of high economic growth trig-
gered, in our model, by increases in domestic
productivity. When expectations turn, the risk
premium soars, precipitating large decreases in
short-term capital inflows and giving rise to a
full-blown financial-cum-real crisis.
Figure 6. Producer manufacturing real output following contagion of the Asian crisis.
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From a policy point of view, the very stark-
ness of the picture of the financial crisis painted
by our simulations implies that many of the
remedies suggested for avoiding future financial
crises will do no such thing. These include:
financial sector reform; better information; the
creation of a new international institution to
supervise international financial transactions
and operate as a lender of last resort; cleaning
up corruption in lending; getting the govern-
ment out of the targeting business; and
improving the governance of the corporate
sector. Of course, these reforms may well
reduce the magnitude of financial crises once
they arise and may well contribute to the
institutional maturity of the country. Indeed,
while, in our model economy, the growth rate
declines resulting from the crisis are of roughly
the right order of magnitude, the collapse in
asset values and exchange rates devised by the
model is considerably too modest. In addition,
the suggested institutional reforms may well be
desirable in and of themselves, as they are likely
to contribute to the institutional maturation of
the developing country.
It is nevertheless significant that, in an
‘‘economy’’ in which all of the reforms listed
above (other than a new international financial
institution), are already in place, the declines in
growth rates are of roughly the right orders of
magnitude. The only thing our model required
for a crisis to develop was short-term financial
markets open to international financial flows
and the herd-behavior induced by common
perceptions of future prospects that are typical
of all expectation-based markets. In this vein,
our analytical model suggests that the funda-
mental remedy for financial crises lies in regu-
lating short-term international flows. Our
experiments thus highlight the now classic
dictum due to Keynes, Aabove all, let finance
be primarily ‘‘national.’’
Avoidance of a financial crisis is not the only
reason for preferring a global economy with
more regulated short-term financial flows to
one in which international capital markets are
completely open. The main reason may well be
that unregulated short-term capital markets
rob national economies of all the indirect,
untargeted policy instruments they retain in a
post-GATT world. These instruments are
needed not only for macroeconomic purposes
but also for the promotion of industrialization
and development.
When fully open capital markets replace the
combination of closed short-term capital
markets and regulated flows of foreign invest-
ment, governments become unable to employ
their traditional policy instruments (interest
rates, government expenditures and exchange
rates) unilaterally, for fear of triggering a
financial crisis: Raising interest rates above
world markets induces a large foreign capital
inflow, setting the stage for a subsequent
financial crisis; fixing them below world
markets, precipitates a large foreign capital
outflow, generating the crisis immediately.
Similarly, setting exchange rates above equi-
librium levels leads to a current account deficit,
raising risk premiums and domestic interest
rates, and leading to a subsequent crisis; fixing
exchange rates below equilibrium stimulates
capital flight and investment abroad in antici-
pation of further devaluations, producing the
crisis outright. Finally, running a budget deficit
to stimulate growth or provide social programs
more generous than the international norm,
causes capital outflows. Flexible exchange
rates, have two opposite eects: on the one
hand, they enable less abrupt adjustments and
therefore may well lead to a softer landing. On
the other hand, flexible exchange rates may well
amplify the eects of international capital flows
by allowing speculation on foreign exchange
markets that are excessively large; excessively
liquid; excessively volatile; too imperfectly
informed; and too subject to herd psychology.
In the words of the UNCTADÕs (1998) Trade
and Development Report,
the ascendancy of finance over industry together with
the globalization of finance have become underlying
sources of instability and unpredictability in the world
economy. (...) In particular, financial deregulation and
capital account liberalization appear to be the best
predictor of crises in developing countries (pp. v and
55).
Almost all recent episodes of financial-cum-
currency instability indicate that the observed
sharp swings in capital flows are mostly a
reflection of large divergences between domes-
tic financial conditions and those in the rest of
the world. These divergences may well have
been required to implement national objectives.
Reversals of capital flows are often associated
with deterioration of the macroeconomic
fundamentals in the domestic country.
However, ‘‘such deterioration often results
from the eects of capital inflows themselves as
well as from external developments, rather than
from shifts in domestic macroeconomic poli-
cies’’ (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 56).
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NOTES
1. Balkan and Yeldan (1998) report, for instance, that
prior to its financial crash in 1994, the speculative attack
on the Turkish asset markets led to an annual gross
volume of $130 billions (about two-thirds of the
country’s GDP) while the net foreign capital inflows
stood around only $5 billions.
2. For a textbook treatment of neoclassical intertem-
poral general equilibrium, see Blanchard and Fischer
(1989) or Obstfeld and Rogo (1996).
3. Throughout the analytical section of the paper we use
the terms ‘‘domestic’’ and ‘‘regional’’ interchangeably.
4. Technically this would mean a drop in the cost of
investment P in Eqn. (9).
5. The subsidies are modeled by introducing a slack
variable for export subsidy adjustments to serve as the
shadow price of the fixed foreign balance—BFBt for
all t.
6. A similar, but less dierentiated eect could have
been accomplished through devaluation.
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